This paper demonstrates how the behavior of credit markets in a transition-like environment can be a function of the market structure in the commercial lending sector that was inherited from the pre-reform economy.
Introduction
Unlike other transition economies, Russia allowed the creation of hundreds of new banking units both prior to and during the initial stages of market reform. The liberalness of its licensing policy resulted in more than 1300 registered banks when prices were freed in 1992. With nearly a thousand credit institutions in the mid-1990s, Moscow entered the market era particularly over-banked. Despite this proliferation of credit institutions and the apparent sectoral competition that accompanied it, comparatively little bank credit was offered to Russian enterprises. In this paper, we investigate one possible explanation for how a more crowded banking sector can diminish the scale and efficiency of commercial lending in a transition-like setting.
The relative underdevelopment of bank lending in transition economies has been widely noted. The literature reports that, despite the re-structuring demands of former state-owned enterprises and the capital needs of start-ups, the region's banks have not done much lending to the private sector (Transition Report 1998) . Russia, in particular, has lagged in this regard. The ratio of commercial bank credit to the private sector to GDP has been much less than in other transitioning economies at similar levels of income. According to the same measure, transition countries lag well behind developing countries as a group.
The reasons for this backwardness are many and complex. Macroeconomic instability and the lingering politicization of the banking sector have certainly played an important role (Johnson, 2000) .
More fundamentally, the slow development of the banking sector across the region can be attributed to the difficulties of both evaluating credit risks and enforcing contracts in the early stages of the transition. Common to both is the general absence of quality information on borrowers' financial performance. At the outset of the transition, firms had not developed credit histories in a market setting. Their financial statements were difficult to interpret and easy to manipulate. Furthermore, private and public institutions that address such problems in mature market economies, e.g., accountants and auditors, credit rating agencies, and state regulatory bodies, have yet to develop. For these reasons, lenders lack information that could help them discern which prospective borrowers would be likely to repay their loans. The poor informational environment can affect adversely the fulfillment of credit contracts since those with the ability to repay loans may choose not to do so if the record of their behavior can be easily obscured or will not be widely publicized. Hence, a firm's disregard for its reputation can increase greatly the risk of extending it credit. This is particularly true in the transitional context because of the slow adoption and uneven enforcement of laws protecting the interests of lenders.
In this paper, we suggest that these fundamental constraints to credit market development are even more problematic when the commercial lending sector is populated, as it has been in Russia, by a large number of institutions. To illustrate this point, we present a model of potential lenders and borrowers in a setting that is neither supported by an effective legal system nor by an informational infrastructure that facilitates distinctions between good and bad credit risks. Initially, the parties in this transition-like environment can enter into only self-enforcing loan agreements and a bank learns about a firm's creditworthiness only by first engaging in highly risky lending activity. Over time, the environment changes as lenders learn about the firms' characteristics and lower cost, third-party contract enforcement becomes available.
This framework reveals the connection between market behavior in successive stages. The value that firms place on access to external financing in the future provides the basis for self-enforcing agreements during the early transition. During this earlier phase, lending patterns determine the extent of informational capital that banks carry with them into the more mature institutional environment. Because of the link between banks' accumulation of informational capital and the use of informal contracting mechanisms, an increased number of banks diminishes the scale and damages the efficiency of loan markets. Having alternative sources for external financing reduces a firm's concern for building a reputation for creditworthiness with any single lender. This lowers the cost of opportunism and thereby diminishes the potential for self-enforcing agreements to sustain lending arrangements. Furthermore, an environment with more commercial lenders diffuses the existing stock of information on the creditworthiness of the existing borrower pool. As we will show, this will be particularly harmful to creditworthy firms.
The logic of the model evolves from the literature that demonstrates how a potential stream of future benefits can deter agents from behaving opportunistically in the present. For instance, by making a credible commitment to terminate funding to a firm whose performance is poor, investors ensure that the firm's management does not divert resources to themselves (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990) . If a potential borrower recognizes that reneging on a loan would damage its reputation and thereby lower the probability, or worsen the terms, of future crediting, the lender designs a selfenforcing contract in which the present discounted value of foregone future borrowing exceeds the short-term benefit of opportunism (Sharpe, 1990) . Similar logic has been used to suggest that a wellfunctioning legal system is not a necessary condition for market development in formerly socialist economies. To some degree, reputation effects may substitute for institutional development (McMillan, 1997; Greif and Kandel, 1995) .
The notion that competition can undermine long-term financial relationships by providing agents with outside options has been explored by Petersen and Rajan (1995) but not in a setting in which formally binding contracts cannot be enforced in the short term. More generally, market structure effects in the financial sector have been framed by the tradeoff between efficiency and stability (Allen and Gale, 2000) . For instance, heightened competition among commercial lenders is argued to contribute to more rapid innovation of financial products and greater short-run allocative efficiency of credit markets. However, by driving down profit margins and reducing the cushion against poorly performing assets and weakening lender incentives to carefully screen clients, more competition can also undermine the long-term stability of the financial system (Gehrig, 1998) .
Similar tradeoffs have been identified with respect to the nascent commercial banking sector in transition countries (Anderson et al., 1996; Bonin and Leven, 1996) . Schnitzer (1999) adds to the transition-specific discussion regarding market structure in the commercial lending sector and draws a conclusion somewhat similar to the one presented here but for different reasons. Focusing on how banks' incentives to screen clients are affected by the market structure, she finds that the larger is the number of competitors the more likely it becomes that banks do not engage in costly screening and, as a consequence, make more bad loans. Her model endogenizes market structure and demonstrates how too many banks may enter the market from a welfare perspective, leading to too little screening and poorer allocation of credit. Although our conclusions are similar, we arrive at them from a different set of assumptions about the most salient characteristics of the transitional environment. We assert that borrowers should not be portrayed as passive recipients of loans. Rather, they should be viewed as strategic actors who operate largely unconstrained by a well-functioning legal system at the outset of the transition. Thus, we endogenize their repayment decision and, unlike Schnitzer, place them in a two-period framework that permits them to borrow from more than one lender. However, we do not endogenize market structure, but rather view this as a feature of the transition environment that is determined to a great degree by policies implemented prior to market liberalization.
Our model also explores the incentives that banks have to improve their informational environment by sharing information about their clients. Although such cooperation would erode their potential to earn informational rents, banks might decide to do so as to mitigate their agency problems. The incentives to engage in this sort of behavior, however, are shown in the model to weaken as the number of banks grows. As has been shown for other nascent markets, information sharing among agents can create a multi-lateral reputational mechanism that deters opportunistic breach of contract in the absence of an effective formal legal system (Greif, 1993) . Even in environments in which the state provides public goods properly, information-sharing mechanisms may evolve to mitigate opportunism. Padilla and Pagano (1997) explain why creditors regularly contribute financial data on their clients to a rating agency by focusing on the tradeoff between lost informational rents and a stronger deterrence mechanism. 2 Unlike our presentation, previous theoretical studies of multi-lateral reputation mechanisms have not explored how this tradeoff is affected by the market structure within the sector.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short summary of the relevant developments in the Russian banking sector. Section 3 outlines the game theoretic model. Section 4 derives a sequential equilibrium and then presents comparative static results that illustrate the cost of over banking. Section 5 explores banks' incentives to share borrower credit histories and Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Commercial Banks and Commercial Credit in Post-Soviet Russia
Although we seek to make a general point about the effect of market structure on commercial lending in post-socialist economies, our motivation is traced to the rather unique development of the Russian banking sector. Several years prior to the liberalization of financial markets in Russia, the Soviet government sub-divided its monobank and re-organized it along sectoral lines. The handful of spetsbanki (specialized banks) that were spun off in this process took on the responsibilities of providing financial services to state-owned enterprises. In subsequent years, as a consequence of the weakening Soviet state and the growing assertiveness of the Russian republic, hundreds of the branches of these spetsbanki split off from their parent organizations to form autonomous banking units. At roughly the same time, the Soviet government tolerated the development of a private business sector. To support its growth, the ban on non-state banks was lifted and hundreds of private financial institutions were established in a short time period. The number of commercial banks registered on Russian territory grew from 24 in January 1989 to 1360 in January 1992 when markets were initially liberalized. Negligible capital requirements and cheap credits from the Central Bank of Russia contributed to continued rapid growth in subsequent years. By January 1995, the number of banks had climbed to 2527. Nowhere else in the post-socialist world did the market era dawn with such a crowded and competitive banking sector. Moscow alone had nearly a thousand banks registered at one time early in the decade.
To suggest that all these institutions competed directly against one another in commercial credit markets would be incorrect. The geographical distribution of banks in Russia has been, and continues to be, highly uneven. Some regions that are remote from Moscow actually entered the market era with highly concentrated banking sectors (Klimanov, 1994) . It has been argued that competitive forces have been dulled by both inherited relationship capital that may have locked in pre-transition bank-borrower ties (Gorbatova, 1995) and the post-1992 formation of financialindustrial groups in which banks and their corporate clients established residual claimancy rights in one another (Johnson, 1997) . Furthermore, many of the new banks were established for narrow reasons and had no interest in competing for new clients; for example, a number were set up to allow founders to tap into subsidized credits from governmental institutions. In spite of these caveats, Russian firms seeking out bank financing, particularly those in the largest cities, could select from a much larger array of credit institutions than firms elsewhere in the post-socialist world.
Despite the inherent obstacles to credit market development, a solid majority of Russian firms borrowed from banks in the early stages of the transition and most reported that they could obtain at least short-term credit with relative ease (Fan et al., 1996) . A World Bank survey conducted in mid-1994 showed that over 80% of the responding firms had taken out a bank loan in the previous two years and over half held a debt to a commercial bank at the time of the survey. Most loans were for under a year and arms-length credit relationships were shown to be more common than loans between parties sharing ownership ties. This survey also confirmed that Russian banks faced significant difficulties with getting repaid. In part, these problems resulted from the inadvertent extension of credit to firms that were simply unable to generate the revenue needed to repay. A significant portion of the poorly performing loan portfolio could also be attributed to the relative ease with which contractual obligations could be shirked. Indeed, Russian banks were vulnerable to all kinds of financial fraud. Borrowers that never had any intention of repaying produced fictitious documents in order to extract loans from inexperienced loan officers. Rough estimates as to the extent of these problems ran into the hundreds of billions of rubles in the mid-1990s (Tosunian, 1995) . The difficulties faced in distinguishing borrowers on the basis of both their intentions and their abilities to repay clearly reduced the amount of credit that banks were willing to extend.
The sheer number of banks from which firms could borrow compounded the problems.
Simply put, the greater numbers made it easier for opportunistic actions to be replicated. For instance, we know that Russian firms illegally and frequently pledged the same asset as collateral to secure loans simultaneously from multiple unsuspecting banks (Interbank Financial House, 1994) .
We know that troubled Russian firms constructed debt pyramids, borrowing from unsuspecting banks to pay off loans to others (Kirichenko et al., 1995) . Indeed, survey evidence shows that enterprises characterizing their financial conditions as normal or good were more likely to have borrowed from a single lender than from multiple banks. However, among enterprises describing their financial conditions as bad, receipt of loans from multiple banks was more common (Aukutsionek, 1994) .
When known, a firm's credit history was often the most important piece of financial information used by a bank in deciding whether to extend a loan to a prospective borrower (Fan et al.., 1996) . However, the more populated the commercial lending sector becomes, the more diffusely this relevant information is held and the easier it is for firms to obscure the details of their borrowing past.
Recognizing the informational problems that complicated their lending activities, the benefits of cooperative measures to alleviate them was not lost on Russian banks. The Association of Russian Banks, the industry's largest trade association, was encouraged to organize and maintain a blacklist of unreliable borrowers (Molchanov, 1996) . However, the association chose not to adopt this role. In 1995, the Moscow Banking Union discussed, but did not actually introduce, a similar database for its two-hundred-plus members (Andrianov, 1995) . Indeed, a number of commentators noted the lack of informational hubs, such as credit rating agencies, describing their absence as an important cause of banks' unwillingness to lend to private firms (Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, 1998).
Broadly speaking, Russian banks did not share credit histories through formal institutional structures. 
Model
The model provides a framework for explaining how acute informational and contract enforcement problems affect the development of credit markets under differing market structures. It is designed to capture some of the salient features of the banking sector during the post-socialist transition, particularly during the first half-decade of market liberalization. In the absence of credit histories or well-developed accounting standards, loan officers operated with little knowledge of a prospective client's ability or willingness to repay a loan. Without much difficulty, a firm might either delay repayment or renege on a loan from one bank and then approach one of the numerous other banks without being concerned that its credit history would become known. Given the nature of this environment, the model demonstrates that having firms' credit histories concentrated in a smaller number of lenders can improve the performance of commercial loan markets.
The model consists of two periods, with the first capturing features of an immature, transitioning economy. The second period represents a movement toward more normal market conditions. There are two different kinds of risk-neutral actors, namely, firms that have projects requiring external financing and banks that have financial resources but do not have direct access to projects. The number of firms and banks are F and B respectively. All actors share a common discount factor, δ, with δ>0. F= F 1 +F 2 , with F 1 >B and F 2 >B. F 1 represents the number of firms that enter the market in the first period; F 2 represents the number of firms that enter the market in the second period.
Each of the firms has access to a single project per period for which it can receive financing from no more than one bank. A firm in the F 1 cohort does not have to borrow from the same bank in both periods but it cannot use earnings retained from the first period project to finance the project in the next period. Each firm has a linear demand for credit g(r)=ar+R in any one period. This function, which is the marginal returns curve on successfully completed projects, is known by both banks and firms and defined such that a<0 and R>0 is the minimum interest rate at which a firm will choose not to borrow. Hence, for r≥R, g(r)=0 but g(R-ε)>0. In the absence of formal contract enforcement capabilities, g(r) can be thought of as a contingent demand curve.
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Firms vary with respect to creditworthiness, defined as the probability that their projects will be successful. For simplicity's sake, we assume that there are two types of borrowers. Type h borrowers engage in projects that are always successful. The return to their investments of g(r) equals the sum of the principal, g(r), the interest charge, g(r)·r, and net income, ò R r dr r g ) (
. Type l borrowers always fail. The return to their investments of g(r) equals just g(r). It is commonly known that the proportion of type h firms among the F 1 firms in the borrowing pool is equal to θ 1 , with 0<θ 1 <1, but banks cannot distinguish a particular firm's type in the first period.
Market structure in the banking sector is determined exogenously and is characterized by the number of banks, B.
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The banks are Bertrand competitors. In periods one and two, each chooses whether or not to offer loans to interested firms. A loan offer to a specific firm in period i consists of an interest charge, r i , which is a function of the bank's lending costs. The marginal cost of lending is presumed to be constant at c. A firm chooses to borrow from the bank that offers the lowest interest rate in any period. If more than one bank offers the same rate, the firm will be paired randomly.
However, if one of the banks offering the same rate had already made a loan to this particular firm, the firm is assumed to remain loyal to its bank. The interest rate offers from banks are public knowledge. They can be observed by all firms as well as by other banks. However, information as to which specific firms are offered a particular rate is not public knowledge.
If banks do not share clients' credit histories, two separate groups of firms present themselves in the second period. Without information sharing, a bank knows only the credit records of its own first-period clients, i.e., which ones repaid and which ones reneged. All other firms are indistinguishable. The firms in this unknown cohort may or may not have repaid their first period loans to other banks. Alternatively, such firms may not have borrowed previously. However, the bank cannot distinguish between the latter two types.
The first period represents the initial post-liberalization phase in which state-sponsored contract enforcement is either unavailable or prohibitively costly. The absence of a well-developed legal system contributes to an environment in which a firm can renege on its loan obligations at no immediate cost. Type h firms may choose to repay or default strategically, i.e., to ignore repayment of both the loan principal and the interest charge. Type l firms, recall, are incapable of repaying the interest charge. Therefore, a firm that repays in full will be identified as type h. For both types of firms, the amount repaid in the first period is a discrete choice variable. A firm either repays in full, principal and interest, or reneges altogether.
The terminal period in our model of the transition represents a movement toward more normal market conditions. First-period borrowers have accumulated a credit history. Publicly sponsored contract enforcement mechanisms become available at a lower cost, which we assume to be zero. This reduction captures, albeit in a stark manner, the improvement of the institutional environment over time. Therefore, banks can expect to prevent high quality borrowers with successful projects from reneging on their loan agreements. Borrowers with unsuccessful projects, although incapable of repaying the interest charge, can at least be compelled to repay an amount equal to the loan's principal, g(r).
In the second period, F 2 new firms enter. The proportion of type h firms among the F 2 >B firms in the borrowing pool is known to equal θ 2 , with 0<θ 2 <1, but banks cannot distinguish a particular firm's type. We assume that θ 2 >θ 1 , i.e., the initial pool of borrowers is, in general terms, less creditworthy than those asking for loans for the first time in the second period. This assumption indicates that, at the outset of the transition, firms with roots in the pre-reform system are disproportionately represented in the borrowing population. These firms were not initially designed to succeed according to market criteria. Consequently, we would not expect their probabilities for success to be as high as those for subsequent entrants.
The sequence of decision-making is as follows. In period one, banks post loan rates.
Subsequently, firms select a bank from which to borrow and a loan size. After this, firms carry out projects and, if successful, choose whether or not to renege on loan agreements. In period two, banks first post loan rates for first-period customers and then for firms that did not borrow from them in first period. After this, firms select a bank from which to borrow and a loan size. Then firms carry out projects. Finally, firms repay banks.
The payoffs to a bank and to a firm that transact at least once are summarized in Table 1.   7 The payoffs to the bank in the second column and the firm in the third column depend upon the As another example, a bank that lends to a type l firm in the first period receives a payoff of -g(r 1 )·(1+c); the bank absorbs both the cost of making the loan and loses the principal. In this case, because of the weak contract enforcement regime, the firm gains an amount equal to the loan principal g(r 1 ) in the first period. Any single row in Table 1 provides the payoffs to a bank and a firm within the context of a bilateral relationship. For firms that borrow from different banks in the two periods, payoffs must be computed by summing up rows. For example, a type h firm that reneges on a loan in the first period and borrows from another bank in the second period earns a payoff of
; the payoff, that is, would include the interest and loan principal not repaid in the first period.
[INSERT TABLE 1]

Analysis
A Separating Equilibrium
The crucial aspect of our model is the first-period repayment decision. If banks believe that those firms that are capable of paying off their loans will choose not to do so, no credit will be extended. Such a delay in the development of credit markets could create clear social costs. Valuable projects would not be undertaken and lenders would not generate any informational capital to help them make more efficient use of their financial resources in the second period. From a myopic perspective, type h firms have everything to gain and nothing to lose by defaulting on their first-period loans. From a longer-term perspective, incentives for strategic default can be curbed by the promise that timely debt repayments increase the potential for receiving external financing at more favorable rates in period two. We demonstrate below that this game has a separating equilibrium in which banks set terms for first-period borrowing such that the expected discounted value to a firm of repaying exceeds the value of defaulting. Hence, type h firms pay off their loans to distinguish themselves from type l firms that cannot repay. To demonstrate the existence of a separating equilibrium, we use a backward induction argument, starting with the second-period lending behavior of banks. 10 Initially, we treat the decision of banks to share information as determined exogenously and explore behaviors conditioned on cooperation not evolving. Before specifying equilibrium loan rates, we define several important benchmark rates. For a bank making a loan to a firm in the second period, the rate at which it could expect to break even would be set such that its lending costs would just equal its expected interest income.
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That is, r 2 would be such that g(r 2 )(p 2Q r 2 -c)=0 where p 2Q is the bank's expectation of the firm's probability of success in the second period. This probability will depend upon what the bank may know about the firm or the pool of borrowers from which it is drawn.
Given that it faces a linear demand for credit, the bank's second period expected profit function is written as: (ar 2Q +R)·(p 2Q r 2 -c), with a<0. Solving for the smaller of the two rates at which this function equals zero, we obtain: 
with the subscript M denoting monopoly. For our two-period model, this distinction between the situation with a single bank and that with multiple lenders is important. For B>1, a firm can approach a bank in the second period that is ignorant of its credit history when banks do not share information.
In this sense, all market structures with multiple banks are similar. A market structure with a single lender is qualitatively different.
When there are multiple banks, each makes offers initially to its first-period clients and only subsequently to those firms that it did not lend to in the first period. Thus, second-period loan rates are a function of the interaction between a price leader, i.e., a firm's first-period lender, and a competitive fringe, consisting of all alternative lenders.
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Therefore, defining the second-period rates requires first identifying the reaction function of competing banks and then specifying the optimal offer for a bank to make to its original clients.
If neither type h nor type l firms repaid first-period loans, banks learn nothing about the type of any single borrower. In that case, the probability that a firm randomly drawn from the entire borrowing pool would be type h, would equal p 2U =(θ 1 F 1 +θ 2 F 2 )/(F 1 +F 2 ). Bertrand-competing banks would thus post the rate of r 2U for all firms, both for those that were their clients in the first period and for those that were not. In this case, banks expect to earn zero profits from making loans in the second period. If, on the other hand, type h firms do repay in the first period, the bank will be able to identify them as such. Similarly, banks will be able to identify their clients that did not repay as type l.
Firms identifiable as type h will be regarded as desirable clients in the second period; firms identifiable as type l will not be made offers.
As noted above, if type h firms are believed to remain with their first-period banks and type l first-period borrowers are believed to be searching for new lenders, the expected success rate of firms in the searching cohort in the second period would be p 2X =θ 2 F 2 /(F 2 +D). Banks in the competitive fringe would settle on a rate of r 2X =c/p 2X . If presented with r 2X , a firm believed to be type l by its first-period bank would join with the F 2 first-period, non-borrowers and accept a loan at this rate from a bank that is ignorant of its credit history.
In this scenario, a bank could use its private knowledge to extract informational rents from its creditworthy first-period clients. If type h firms repay their first-period loans, the bank that made the loan to them will know their creditworthiness with certainty, whereas other banks will not. Given that these type h firms cannot signal credibly their quality to other banks, they face a potential hold-up problem. Having defined the loan rates offered to firms in the second period under two sets of beliefs about the first-period actions of type h firms, we examine that first-period decision to repay or renege.
Recall that the firms, unlike their banks, observe directly the outcome of their first-period projects.
Having carried out a successful project in the first period, type h firms that repay their loan could expect a two-period payoff of
On the other hand, by defaulting, the firm could expect to take away a two-period payoff of
The first-period lending behavior of banks will determine the relative values of these two outcomes with a firm choosing whichever action brings the higher expected payoff. Therefore, if a bank makes a loan, it must choose a first-period rate that is incentive compatible with repayment.
The cost for not doing so is severe. Not only would principal and interest payments from type h clients be lost to the bank in the first period, so too would the opportunity to learn information that could be of value in the second period.
When there are multiple lenders, a bank's first-period problem is to select an r 1 subject to both the incentive compatibility and non-negative profit constraints: (r 1 )(r 1 -c)-(1-θ 1 )g(r 1 )(1+c)+ δθ 1 g(r 2MH )(r 2MH -c)≥0 (5b).
Equations 4a and 5a represent the incentive compatibility constraints. The left-hand sides of these equations represent the discounted value of the expected net surplus to be gained from repaying.
This amount reflects the value to a type h firm of being offered a second-period loan from a bank that knows that it repaid in the first period. When there are multiple banks, the discounted value of the expected net surplus gained from repaying is a function of the difference between r 2Y and r 2X .
Respectively, these are the second-period rates offered by a bank to its clients in good credit standing and to firms to which it is extending a loan for the first time. When there is only one bank, the discounted value of the expected net surplus gained from repaying is a function of the difference between r 2MH and R. The right hand side of the constraint represents the gains to the firm from strategic default. If they choose to lend, therefore, banks will select an r 1 such that this constraint is satisfied. The interests of the lender and its type h clients will thus coincide, and the loan would be repaid. The loan contract would be self-enforcing.
If they are to lend, banks must also select an r 1 that satisfies the non-negative profit constraint: equations 4b and 5b. By not lending, i.e., by choosing an r 1 ≥R such that firms will choose not to borrow, a bank is guaranteed a payoff of zero. Profits can be generated from making incentive compatible loans to type h firms in period one; once initiated, those relationships can lead to banks earning informational rents in period two. These potential gains are represented by the first and last terms on the left-hand sides of equations 4b and 5b. However, a bank will weigh those potential gains against the losses that would be incurred by lending positive amounts to type l firms in the first period. These losses are represented by the (1-θ 1 )g(r 1 )(1+c) terms in equations 4b and 5b.
Solving for the profit maximizing first-period rate for the case of Bertrand competing lenders, we obtain r 1 = r 1N . This rate will be such that it is greater than or equal to the rate at which the incentive compatibility constraint binds, r C . That is, if r 1 <r C , the borrowing firm would have the incentive to behave opportunistically. 18 We also know that r 1N <R, i.e., banks will wish to lend a positive amount in the first period. Since θ 1 >0 and c<r 2Y <R, a Bertrand competing bank can expect to generate positive profits in the second period from a relationship initiated with a type h firm in the first period. Given this, it will be in the bank's interest to offer borrowers a rate r 1N <R and lend to any potential borrower in the first period. These loans do not have to be large in order for the bank to learn which firms are creditworthy and which are not. Hence, a small loan can generate the same information capital as a larger loan but minimize the inevitable losses that would be incurred by lending to type l firms in the first period. Thus, there will exist a rate r 1N <R such that a bank can expect to earn non-negative profits from initiating lending relationships in the first period. On the other hand, by posting an interest rate r 1 ≥R at which firms would choose not to borrow, a bank's first-period profits would be zero. Second-period profits would also be zero because of Bertrand competition and the bank's inability to earn informational rents.
Solving for the profit maximizing first-period rate for the case of a single lender, we get r 1 = r 1M . For similar reasons, we know that r 1M will be greater than or equal to the rate at which the incentive compatibility constraint binds. We also know that r 1M <R. All F 1 eligible firms will receive and accept loan offers in the first period. For B>1, the interest rate will be r 1N ; for B=1, the interest rate will be r 1M . Having shown that the beliefs and strategies that we outlined do indeed constitute a separating equilibrium, equilibrium loan rates are summarized below in Table 2 . These depend on the market structure in the banking sector and the credit record of the borrower.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
A Comparison of Market Structures
For any B>1, a firm can approach a bank in the second period that is ignorant of its credit record. In this narrow sense, all market structures with multiple banks are similar. However, as the market becomes less concentrated, the stock of informational capital becomes more diffused throughout the banking sector. We show below how this diffusion of borrower credit histories across a larger population of lenders has an adverse effect on the behavior of this market. (1-θ 1 ), which is clearly greater than zero. As long as the numerator of this expression is positive, we know that As the number of banks increases, the interest rates offered to borrowers in the second period will increase as well. Because dr 2X /dB>0, type h firms among the F 2 cohort will pay higher rates and receive smaller loans as B increases; facing higher rates, their second-period surplus, ò The result above derives from the diffusion of credit history data under more competitive conditions.
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As B increases, each bank carries with it into the second period a smaller fraction of the information capital, i.e., knowledge of which firms are type h and which are type l, accumulated by the banking sector as a whole in the first period. Therefore, from the perspective of any single bank, the pool of firms seeking out second-period loans from lenders with which they have yet to establish a credit record has a higher percentage of prior defaulters; this increases second-period lending rates.
In other words, the diffusion of borrower credit histories across a larger number of banks decreases the quality of the pool of borrowers approaching banks for first-time loans in the second period.
Type h firms among both the F 1 and F 2 cohorts are clearly harmed. Proposition 2. In the second period, interest rates increase and social surplus declines as F 1 increases, F 2 decreases, θ 1 decreases or θ 2 decreases for B≥2.
Proof. Given r 2Y , In aggregate terms, social surplus declines in the second period as lending rates deviate increasingly from the constant marginal lending cost. Q.E.D.
From the results above, we see how low quality first-period borrowers impose a negative externality not only on their high quality first-period counterparts but also on high quality firms that enter the credit market in the second period. If the first-period cohort were to be relatively larger or less creditworthy, the interest rates charged to high quality firms that borrow in period two would be higher. Conversely, if the second-period cohort were to be larger or more creditworthy, the interest rates charged to high quality firms that borrow in period two would be lower.
Proposition 3. In the first period, lending volume and social surplus decline as B increases for B>B*.
Proof. The first period interest rate, r 1N , will depend upon the cost to the type h borrower of strategic default:
. Hence, r 1N is chosen so that the loan is incentive compatible. Solving for this area, A , given the values of r 2X and r 2Y as functions of B , we obtain: 
Examining the above expression, in the limit as B approaches infinity, the cost of strategic default approaches:
We know that A>0 because r 2Y < r 2X . Since
, there must exist a B*, i.e., a threshold number of banks, for which B≥B*, dA/dB<0. Consequently, for large enough values of B, it will be true that dr 1N /dB>0. Hence, for B≥B*, the first-period incentive compatibility constraint faced by banks becomes tighter as B increases and A decreases. In the limit, the cost for engaging in strategic default approaches zero. Therefore, for a large enough value of B, any further increase in the number of banks will decrease the amount that banks can lend in the first period. Q.E.D.
Having shown some of the adverse effects of increased competition in the banking sector for B≥2, we examine the comparison between monopolistic and competitive market structures. As noted above, this distinction between the case with a single bank and that with multiple lenders is important since it helps express one of the model's key relationships. For any B>1, a firm can approach a bank in the second period that is ignorant of its credit history, so long as banks do not share this information. In this narrow sense, all market structures with multiple banks are similar. ) ( ) ( holds, the cost to a type h firm of reneging in the first period, in terms of foregone surplus, on a loan from a monopolistic lender, i.e., the left-hand side of the inequality, exceeds the cost if there are multiple lenders. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint will bind at a lower value of r 1 . Therefore, it would be possible for a monopoly bank, under certain parameterizations, to charge less and lend more to firms in the first period.
The potential divergence from the standard pricing and welfare relationship between monopoly and competition derives from the link between banks' accumulation of information capital, i.e., credit histories, and the use of informal contracting mechanisms. The smaller number of creditors, a monopoly in this case, increases a type h firm's concern for building a reputation for creditworthiness with any single lender. With multiple lenders, firms can exploit the ignorant in the second period. This lowers the cost to opportunism and diminishes the potential of self-enforcing agreements to sustain lending arrangements. Generalizing for any n-period model with a similar structure, i.e., with formal contracts that are unenforceable until the n th period, all market structures with B≥n would be similar in this sense. However, for B<n, a firm that tried to change banks each period would eventually have to approach a bank from which it had already borrowed. In an environment in which self-enforcing contracts are the only means for sustaining inter-temporal transactions, the concentration of information capital in a smaller number of banks strengthens the power of reputation effects by raising the cost of strategic default.
Information Sharing
We have not yet formally contemplated the possibility that banks could address their information and contract enforcement problems by sharing information about their clients' firstperiod credit histories. Such an action would allow banks both to distinguish prior defaulters from new entrants in the second period and to craft a more powerful constraint on opportunism in the first period. In this section, we endogenize this decision by giving banks the option to cooperate. If sharing information on their borrowers is in their collective interest, each bank absorbs a cost of Z/B before first-period loans are made.
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This fee could be interpreted as a payment to sponsor the efforts of a trade association or credit bureau to collect and disseminate the first-period credit histories of the firms.
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Prior to making second period loans, banks learn all borrowers' records among the F 1 cohort, i.e., whether a firm repaid or reneged on a loan or did not borrow in the first period.
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If banks were to share their clients' credit histories, a greater percentage of second-period loans would be made with lenders better informed as to a borrower's type. Information exchange would mitigate banks' second-period information problems by allowing them to distinguish firstperiod defaulters from new entrants that are accessing the credit market for the first time. On the other hand, since it entails banks revealing the identities of their best clients to their competitors, information sharing reduces the rents that banks could have otherwise extracted from first-period clients. Hence, second-period loans to firms that repaid in the first period will have to be priced more competitively. Thus, the tradeoff that lenders face is one between the benefits of better information and the loss of profits due to greater competition.
Can this type of information sharing be sustained in equilibrium? To answer this question, we conduct a backward induction exercise similar to the one in the previous section. If banks share borrower credit histories at the end of period one and neither type h nor type l firms repaid firstperiod loans, banks collectively learn nothing about the type of any single firm in the F 1 cohort. In that case, the Bertrand-competing banks would charge firms in that cohort r 2 =c/θ 1 and firms in the F 2 cohort r 2 =c/θ 2 . These loan offers would be accepted and, at these rates, banks would expect to earn zero profits in the second period.
On the other hand, if type h firms do repay in the first period, all banks in the second period will be able to identify them as type h. Similarly, all banks will be able to identify those firms that did not repay as type l. Firms identified as type h from the F 1 cohort will be regarded as desirable clients in the second period and will be offered r 2 = r 2H =c by the fully informed Bertrand competitors. No bank will make a loan offer to any firm that did not repay its original lender in period one. Firms in the F 2 cohort will be offered loans at the break-even rate of r 2 =c/θ 2 . All loan offers will be accepted.
At these rates, banks expect to earn zero profits from lending in the second period.
Having defined the loan rates offered to firms in the second period under information sharing and two sets of beliefs about the first-period actions of type h firms, we examine the first-period decision to repay or renege. As before, if these loans are to be repaid, the contracts must be incentive compatible.
Since it is not in the lender's interest to offer a loan contract that provides the type h borrower with the incentive to behave opportunistically, the first-period problem is to select an r 1 subject to both the incentive compatibility and non-negative profit constraints:
Note the difference in equations 4b and 6b. Unlike banks that do not share information, banks that share information forego the opportunity to earn informational rents from their first-period type h clients in the second period. There is no long-term value to a bank in establishing a multi-period relationship. Hence, non-zero profits can be generated only in the first period.
Denote the rate that is consistent with Bertand competition and that satisfies these two constraints as r 1I . Unlike the no-information-sharing case, we do not know whether r 1I <R, i.e., we do not know whether or not banks, having decided to share information, will actually wish to lend a positive amount in the first period. The profit maximizing r 1 <R may generate negative profits if the borrowing pool is populated in sufficient numbers by type l firms. Thus, it may be in a bank's interest to post a rate r 1I ≥R. Having decided to share information, a bank's best strategy may be to select a first-period lending rate at which firms would choose not to borrow. As a consequnce, the bank's first-period profits would be zero. Proof. For B>1, changing B has no effect on the equilibrium interest rates that banks offer under information sharing in either the first period or second period. The same firms receive loans at the same rates regardless of the value of B, and banks' joint profits are not a function of B.
However, when banks do not share information, second-period interest rates can change with B. As B increases, there is an increase in both r 2X and r 2Y (see Proposition 1). Banks make positive profits on loans made to type h clients at r 2Y , but make zero profits on loans to firms of unknown credit history at r 2X . If r 2Y <r 2MH , banks' second period joint profits increase as B increases. Thus, the relative value of information sharing for banks in the second period decreases as B increases. Q.E.D.
Hence, an increasingly crowded commercial lending sector affects adversely the performance of credit markets. However, the weakening of the incentive to share information that accompanies an increasing B is not a function of any increases in the aggregate cost of sharing. Recall that joint costs of information exchange, Z, are not affected by B, and per bank costs of sharing actually decline as B increases.
Our results suggest two reasons why banks may not be interested in sharing borrower credit histories in order to overcome the information and contract enforcement problems that inhibit credit market development. First, the desire to share information will be contingent upon the quality of the first-period borrowing pool, θ 1 . Because information sharing eliminates opportunities to extract informational rents, the payoff to cooperation can come only in the first period. Without a sufficiently high quality borrowing pool at the outset, information sharing will not be an attractive option to lenders. Second, in period two, information sharing's value relative to no information sharing declines as the number of banks increases. When B is large, the greater diffusion of information allows a bank to extract more informational rents from its type h first-period clients. This weakens the incentive to share information and leads to less lending to type h firms.
Conclusion
Our model focuses attention on how choices made by lenders and borrowers during the transition are affected by the inherent limitations on both commercial information and contract enforcement mechanisms. Obviously, these constraints retard the development of robust financial markets. Poor information on firms' creditworthiness leads banks to allocate scarce financial capital sub-optimally. Weak contract enforcement mechanisms restrict the size of loans to firms who could profit from borrowing more. What is less self-evident is how these difficulties may make markets behave in ways that are fundamentally different from those in a more mature setting. Our results add a new consideration to the debate about how market structure in the commercial lending sector may affect the performance of credit markets.
The transition away from socialism and toward markets was premised on the notion that an economic system based on decentralized information and decision-making outperforms centralized planning. While not disputing this basic point, this paper demonstrates how the diffusion of information can harm the development of new markets in some instances, particularly when formalized contract enforcement mechanisms are not effective. If borrower credit histories serve as both an important source for distinguishing between good and bad credit risks and as a means to design self-enforcing contracts, their concentration in a limited number of lenders can improve the efficiency of credit markets relative to a situation in which they are diffused across a larger number of lenders in a more competitive banking sector.
The primary policy implication from this analysis is not that a high degree of concentration in the commercial lending sector is unambiguously good in a transition-like, underdeveloped institutional environment. Greater concentration may produce banks that feel that they are too big to fail, which could result in overly risky lending practices. Greater competition certainly promotes innovation and dynamic efficiency in ways not considered in our model. However, our results suggest a reason for policy makers to guard against having too liberal an entry policy into the commercial lending sector before fundamental market-supporting institutions have been given time to develop. 2 Padilla and Pagano (1997) report that Dun & Bradstreet collect information on more than 31.7 million clients worldwide. More than 300 banks regularly contribute data on their clients financial health electronically and thousands more do so by phone or mail. Over 600,000 companies provide information on their customers' payment records, including information on delays and defaults. In the UK, credit reference agencies collect and disseminate information reported by finance companies about their clients.
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3 A large number of insolvent banks engaged in this sort of behavior themselves, leading to the collapse of the inter-bank credit market in August 1995. 4 However, trade association membership is high in Russia and, in other sectors of the economy, these organizations do provide information-sharing services that allow them to discern the reliability of both clients and suppliers to their members (Recanatini and Ryterman, 2000; Johnson et al., 1999) . 5 Since lenders share a common belief with firms about the shape of a firm's demand curve, posting an interest rate implies a willingness to lend a certain quantity because banks have prior information about the amount of credit that legitimate businesses use. Any prospective borrower that responds to an interest rate offer by seeking credit in excess of the amount prescribed by the contingent demand curve will not be offered a loan. Firms that might ask for more reveal themselves to be opportunists that wish to take advantage of the weak contract enforcement regime to abscond with the bank's money. transition, the assumption seems appropriate. The degree of concentration in the transitional banking sector was, in large part, a function of developments that pre-dated the introduction of markets and the processes represented in this model. 7 These are just the payoffs from any single bilateral relationship. Recall that a bank may make loans to more than one firm in any given period and a firm may transact with up to two different banks, one in each of the two periods. 8 We make the simplifying assumption that the only costs faced by the firms are financing costs. 9 Formally, the solution concept used in this two-stage game with observed actions and incomplete information is a sequential Nash, or, perfect Bayesian, equilibrium. This requires specifying a set of beliefs and strategies, such that strategies are optimal given a player's beliefs, and beliefs are obtained from both the equilibrium strategies and the observed actions using Bayes' rule. Any borrower takes into account the effect of his actions on the beliefs and strategies of the lenders. Furthermore, lenders react optimally to the borrowing firm's actions given their posterior beliefs about a borrower's type. 10 The backward induction argument begins from the assumption that each bank loaned to the same numbers of good and bad firms in the first period. Banks, that is, are presumed to be of the same size. Our results are not sensitive to this assumption that, admittedly, does not comport with the reality of Russia's banking system. We make the assumption only to simplify the presentation later in the paper. See footnote 18.
11 These benchmarks allow us to define rates that will prevail under equilibrium in Bertrand competition. 12 In the case of a linear demand curve, lenders face a quadratic profit function in which there can be two interest rates for which profits equal zero. Bertrand competitors would choose the lower of the two rates because the higher rate would not be a stable equilibrium; if all had chosen the higher rate, any single bank could increase its profits by offering an interest rate slightly lower.
